How China wants to control the South Sea

China's rise as a superpower has come with a revision of the boundaries set by international law.

Map of the 9 Dotted Line. Disputed islands claimed by China

As can be seen on the map, China claims that it has rights over all the sea space that falls within the ‘nine-dashed line’, an area that belonged to the Qing Dynasty. The maritime borders are currently in conflict between the countries of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The conflict stems from China's unilateral delimitation of its maritime borders, which no state recognises as valid. The International Court of Justice in 1951 in the UK-Norway Fisheries Case already ruled on this issue: ‘The delimitation could not depend on the will of the coastal State alone as expressed in its internal law (...) the validity of the delimitation vis-à-vis third States unquestionably depends on international law’. According to the Law of the Sea, the delimitation of maritime boundaries must therefore be carried out multilaterally and by mutual agreement of the parties concerned. China claims to respect this law as a global guideline in the current times, but on the other hand claims its historical rights over the area. In 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China had no legal basis for its territorial claims, but the Asian giant has ignored international law.

China's imposition of maritime borders implies the appropriation of nearly 80 per cent of the sea, which translates into access to a rich source of natural resources (gas, oil and minerals) and islands and archipelagos. The appropriation of this territory would not only give it enormous benefits in the extraction of resources but would also give it greater control over world trade, more than 25% of which passes through this area. The disregard for the ruling has materialised in an increasingly common presence of disputes between the navies of the countries involved. The criticism voiced by the US was responded to by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 2015: ‘China, like the United States, upholds freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, but opposes any attempt by any country to challenge China's territorial sovereignty... under the pretext of safeguarding freedom of navigation’.

This conflict has escalated since China adopted ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy. China is imposing its judgement through the construction of artificial islands. These islands are located at strategic points and China claims its right (of dubious existence) to claim the surrounding waters and associated extraction rights. On these islands it is placing military bases to back up its claim.

This situation is conducive to the US ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. China's aggressiveness towards its immediate neighbours is perceived as threatening to its own. For this reason, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are seeking to move closer to the US ally in order to establish military alliances to counter China's growing military power. What the Asian countries are looking for is to be able to rely on the US deterrent, not its permanent presence. Unlike their European counterparts, Southeast Asian countries primarily understand that their geographic location ‘obliges’ them to understand China. China's financial, industrial, commercial and tourism power makes it an indispensable partner for most of the region's economies. On the other hand, they fear the revisionist will expressed by Beijing, which they intend to limit with the treaties with the US.

The dilemma China faces is that the more it insists on ‘taking over’ the South China Sea, the closer its neighbours will move closer to its US rival. The bid to directly control 80 per cent of the sea may bring it great geo-economic as well as geo-strategic benefits. At the same time, a direct confrontation with international law may come at great reputational cost. As a country that has worked so hard to build a reputation as a stable, reliable and respectful partner, assertive drift under Xi's leadership may prove counterproductive. A miscalculation could prove fatal to the plans for imperial restoration that Chinese policy-makers crave.